The
Kyoto treaty would have wrecked our economy, if I can be blunt.
—George
W. Bush, 2005.
If
I may be blunt myself, of all the fears
concerning climate change and addiction to oil, the fear of wrecking
our economy is most paralyzing and least substantial. But even if the
costs were greater, turning away in fear from the challenges of
climate and addiction would sell short America’s past and lay
our own responsibilities at the feet of future generations.
The irony of America’s energy policy, from the Kyoto agreement
in 1997 through the present, is that by shouldering little
responsibility for our energy use, we have once again handed the
power of the oil market to OPEC. The connection is straightforward.
The Kyoto treaty called on nations to reduce their use of fossil
fuel, mainly coal and oil. Reducing the use of oil makes oil less
scarce and reduces its price. In fact, as we saw in the previous
chapter, reducing the world’s use of oil was what crushed
OPEC’s market power for eighteen years.
Our choice was not between a wrecked economy and economic growth, it
was between controlling our own energy policy and letting OPEC’s
high prices force upon us an energy policy of its own design. It is a
poor policy indeed, as OPEC has no intention of helping us end
addiction or global warming. But its policy is forcing us to conserve
oil. Already our oil use has stopped climbing, and we used only one
tenth percent more oil in 2007 than in 2004. President Bush is
claiming credit for reducing energy intensity, as high prices push
us—as they did in 1975—towards tighter fuel-economy
standards. While conservation is a benefit, when administered by OPEC
it comes at far too high a price.
Instead of idly waiting to see what OPEC had in store for us, we
could have chosen our own destiny. Our own market-based policies
could have guided the use of better technology to reduce our
dependence on coal and oil. This would have, according to the
Department of Energy, reduced the world price of oil—just as it
did in the 1980s. The DOE discovered this in 1998 when Congress asked
them how the Kyoto treaty would affect our economy. They also
discovered that implementing the Kyoto treaty, flawed as it was,
would not wreck our economy.
It is too late to avoid the present bout of tribute-paying to those
foreign and domestic powers who control the world’s oil. But we
can, in a few years, regain control of our energy destiny by heeding
the advice of a president who presided over one of the most perilous
times in America’s history. Before confronting World War II,
Franklin D. Roosevelt faced the dangers of the Great Depression. He
did not flinch, saying “Only a foolish optimist can deny the
dark realities of the moment.” But he also warned of the
greater danger of being ruled—and paralyzed—by fear,
famously declaring: “We have nothing to fear but fear itself.”
Just as it was sixty years ago, fear itself is again our greatest
enemy. That’s why in writing this book I will begin by
dispensing with the often exaggerated dangers of economic ruin,
catastrophic shortages, and unstoppable climate change. And, although
the book is motivated by the real dangers of dependence on foreign
oil and global warming, I will not dwell on these. Instead, I will
present a plan to improve our chances against both threats, without
wasting money and at surprisingly low cost. While no panacea exists,
what we need as a nation is courage, cool heads, and a clever,
low-risk plan of action.
Overcoming
Fear
Only after the fear of taking action has been laid to rest will it
make sense to plan a more secure and ecological energy future. But
after so much misleading rhetoric, a simple claim that America’s
economy is strong will not suffice. The belief in economic damage is
so ingrained that it afflicts even some of those most willing to take
action.
Undoing these misconceptions requires looking at energy policy from
all angles—from the expert, rather than the political,
perspective, from the perspective of economic growth, from the
perspective of physical possibility, and finally, from the present
perspective of inaction.
To begin, consider what the government actually found when it studied
the cost of complying with the Kyoto Protocol. In 1998, Congress
asked the Department of Energy (DOE) to examine this cost. Congress
required DOE to assume compliance was initiated as late as possible
and then very suddenly. Congress also prohibited any analysis of fuel
economy or energy efficiency standards. It only allowed DOE to model
a carbon tax.
In spite of these cost-increasing assumptions, DOE found no reduction
in long-run economic growth. The shock of sudden compliance was found
to cause a temporary slowing of growth, but by 2020 the GDP was less
than one percent behind the no-policy scenario. But what about more
recent proposals that seek to accomplish even more than the Kyoto
Protocol?
For over twenty years economists have been estimating the costs of
energy policies. There have been dozens of such studies, and these
studies have generally found costs in the range of 1 to 3 percent of
GDP for strong policies. I will use a cost of 2 percent as a
benchmark, though most proposals have costs that increase slowly and
do not reach 2 percent for decades. I will return to the question of
why the cost should be this low after dispensing with a more urgent
question.
Could
a 2 Percent Cost Wreck Economic Growth?
Confusingly, politicians and pundits always seem to tie
energy-program costs to reduced economic growth. This happens so
consistently that when I first checked on costs, I was afraid that an
effective policy would reduce the economy’s growth rate by 2
percent—from a normal 3 percent per year to 1 percent per year.
That would indeed wreck the economy.
When President Bush announced his Climate Change Initiative on
Valentines day 2002, he said:
Our nation must have economic growth -- growth to create opportunity;
growth to create a higher quality of life for our citizens. Growth
is also what pays for investments in clean technologies, increased
conservation, and energy efficiency.
It almost sounds as if growth itself is in question. Perhaps, if the
President picked the wrong climate-change initiative, America would
stop growing. This didn’t sound right to me, but if true and
the country grew even 1% slower for 100 years, the economy would make
almost two thirds less progress. Such a dire outcome worried me even
though the no-growth punditry appeared to be based on some unspoken
pop-economic theory or else a misunderstanding of real economics. No
studies or papers were ever cited.
For help with this question I turned to the work of Dale Jorgenson.
Jorgenson has a chair at Harvard, has been President of the American
Economic Association, and has won many honors in economics. Perhaps
more importantly, he is the man who wrote the book, figuratively and
literally, in this area of economics.
So I bought Jorgenson’s Growth Volume 2: Energy, the
Environment and Economic Growth. The first study in the book analyzes
the 1973–1986 OPEC crisis, the original great “energy-policy”
experiment.
Of all the studies estimating the costs of an economy-wide policy
this appears to be the most reliable because it examines a policy
that really happened. Most studies examine future proposed policies.
The strength of the OPEC policy provided Jorgenson with an ideal data
set for his analysis.
Two of his most interesting scenarios in his chapter are called OIL72
and OIL81. The first looks at what would have happened if OPEC had
never raised oil price beyond $12.50 per barrel (in 2007 dollars),
the price in 1972. The OIL81 scenario looks at what would have
happened if the oil price had stayed at its 1981 value of about $90
per barrel. In the good-news case, the country would have been a bit
richer, and in the bad-news case a bit poorer. The difference is the
impact of raising the oil price from $12.50 to $90 and keeping it
there permanently. Jorgenson found that policy would have reduced GDP
by 2.5 percent.
Jorgenson’s analysis shows that ten, twenty, or fifty years
after oil reached $90 per barrel, the U.S. would be 2.5 percent
poorer than if oil had stayed at $12.50 per barrel. This tells us
that growth has not been damaged. If growth had been permanently
slowed by this harsh and permanent energy policy, GDP would have
fallen further and further behind each year.
Although this is probably the most convincing analysis, because it is
based on a wealth of real-world data and examines a harsh policy, it
is completely standard with regard to long-run economic growth. Every
analysis I have examined shows the same effect. Long-run growth is
not damaged by an energy policy.
In fact economists are not surprised by this. Long-run growth is
primarily determined by technological progress, and this is not
slowed by energy policy. Because energy policies encourage the use of
more advanced and efficient technology in place of fossil fuel, there
is no reason to suspect they would slow technical progress, or
economic growth.
Looking at the historical performance of the U.S. economy tends to
confirm this finding. In 1982 the economy slumped, but in the next
three years it grew 4.5, 7.2 and 4.1 percent—quite a record
considering average growth is only 3.1 percent and OPEC’s price
didn’t collapse until 1986.
So this answers the question. A policy that costs 2 percent of GDP
cannot wreck economic growth. Imposing a 2 percent cost on the
economy will slow its growth only until the GDP has fallen 2 percent
behind. If it stopped growth, that would take only about eight
months. After that the economy will resume normal growth
indefinitely.
Is
2 Percent a Large Sacrifice?
President Nixon announced Project Independence just three weeks after
the start of the oil embargo in 1973, saying
We must ask everyone to lower the thermostat in your home by at least
six degrees so that we can achieve a national daytime average of 68
degrees. –President Nixon, November 7, 1973.
President Carter endorsed the same temperature and suggested wearing
a sweater. But over the past thirty years, the talk of sacrifice has
shifted dramatically. Even among environmentalists, only a few
emphasize sacrifice, and most don’t think much is needed.
Perhaps Governor, and Presidential Candidate, Bill Richardson, in an
interview posted on the environmental web site grist.org, expressed
the current view most clearly.
I believe it's going to take … sacrifice for the common good …
not sacrifice, like Americans wearing sweaters and turning the heat
down. … Maybe, instead of driving to work, once a month go
mass transit.
Richardson is not wrong, but he’s missing a crucial part of the
picture. Usually sacrifice means getting by with less. A strong
energy policy does not require that. It will cost us something, but
even with the “sacrifice” we will be getting by with
more, not less. But we won’t have quite as much more as we
could have had.
Here’s an example of “sacrifice” with growth. The
Apollo program sent a man to the moon but made us poorer—we
paid more taxes to cover its costs. But it didn’t hurt growth.
America grew richer at the same time that Apollo’s costs were
increasing. The costs increased much more slowly than the economy
grew, so the “sacrifice” for Apollo didn’t make the
country poorer. On the day we landed a man on the moon, the country
was richer than on the day President Kennedy announced that goal.
Just not quite as much richer as it might have been.
Perhaps it’s worth restating the obvious at this point. The
purpose of an Apollo program or an energy program is to buy a moon
landing, better climate or more security. That’s why there is a
cost. If the policy is wise, the benefit will outweigh the cost. The
gain will be worth more than the small sacrifice.
In April of 2007 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
looked forty years into the future at the impacts of seven
cap-and-trade bills before Congress. These would place a decreasing
cap on greenhouse gas emissions. The strictest scenario modeled by
MIT was as strict as any of the bills except the Waxman bill. Figure
1 shows the increase in “market consumption” per person
(not per family) from 2010 until 2050, under this scenario.
Figure 1. After forty years, per-person (not per
family) consumption would only have only reached $72,700 instead of
$74,500, under a strict greenhouse-gas policy. The policy would
reduce emissions 75%. The calculations were published by the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in April 2007.
Consumption more than doubles, from $31,900 per person in 2010 to
$74,500 per person in 2050. But with a strict greenhouse-gas policy,
it will be 2.4 percent less in 2050 than without it. The “sacrifice”
means getting 128 percent richer instead of 133 percent richer.
The required “sacrifice” is much smaller in the first few
years of the policy. After ten years, consumption is only half a
percent lower. Deeper cuts in CO2 are required over time. After
fifteen years, CO2 has been cut about 50 percent and after forty
years, about 75 percent, relative to the no-policy case.
The reason the economy falls further behind over time is not because
economic growth is damaged, but because the policy becomes stricter.
If energy problems abate and the policy stays constant, growth will
be unaffected. A constant policy has no impact on growth. The
“sacrifice” required can also be viewed as a delayed
increase in income. Under MIT’s strict policy, the country must
wait until 2051 to achieve the market income it could have attained
in 2050.
How
Can it Be So Cheap?
You may now be wondering if the economists that come up with these
numbers are in touch with reality. How could it be so inexpensive to
cut back on fossil fuel, the very life blood of a modern economy? Why
are we so addicted, if it’s so cheap to switch?
The basic answer is this. America is rich, and fossil fuel is not as
costly as you might think. Much of the cost of electricity and
gasoline is not the cost of fossil fuel, but of wires, generators,
refineries and so on.
In 1998 DOE’s model predicted that the largest carbon savings
would come from replacing coal-fired generators with natural-gas
fired generators. Coal is higher in carbon per unit energy than other
fossil fuels and produces 35% of U.S. CO2 emissions. Natural gas is
the cleanest fossil fuel and generates electricity more efficiently.
So using gas instead of coal would reduce U.S. CO2 emissions by 20
percent, a very good start. How much would that cost us?
Coal is cheap. All the coal we use costs only 0.2 percent of GDP.
That’s two one thousandths of domestic production. However coal
plants are relatively expensive, so gas-fired electricity costs only
as much as using double-priced coal. Using gas instead of coal would
cost 0.4 percent instead of 0.2 percent of GDP. That would reduce
carbon emissions by 20 percent. At that rate, we could eliminate all
carbon emissions (that’s over doing it) for only 1 percent of
GDP.
Wind power is a little more expensive than using natural gas, but it
would eliminate 100 percent of the CO2 emissions. So it’s
almost as cheap a way to reduce emissions as switching to natural
gas. A third option is nuclear power. It costs about the same amount
as wind power and also eliminates CO2 emissions. (Of course building
power plants of any kind causes some CO2 emissions but these are very
small compared with the amount emitted by producing power with coal.)
What about oil?
As I write this, at the start of 2008, with oil costing almost $100
per barrel, I cannot escape a startling conclusion. OPEC and the
world oil market have already forced on us an oil-conservation
policy—in the form of high oil prices—that is more costly
than required for the strictest of the proposed climate-change
policies. We do not need to spend more, we need to take revenues back
from OPEC and Exxon while maintaining a policy as effective as the
one now in place. Although OPEC has the most control of world price,
all suppliers, including American suppliers, benefit equally from the
high prices.
The effect of high oil prices has, for three years running, stopped
the growth in oil use, and if the past is a guide, oil use will
decline—provided the price stays high. The policy goal should
be to keep the price high while recapturing revenues from OPEC and
Exxon.
Even
Cheaper?
The cost of alternative energy is easier to pin down than the cost of
conservation, so I used alternative energy as a reliable way to show
that costs could be low. But when OPEC raised prices, the world
responded mostly by conserving, because there is more cheap
conservation available than cheap alternative fuel.
A 2007 report from the McKinsey Company, the world's leading
management consulting firm, examined dozens of different approaches
to abating greenhouse gases, including conservation measures,
forestation, alternative fuels and more. They found that a large
fraction of the required emission reduction could be accomplished at
a cost savings (a negative cost) of half a percent of world GDP. For
example, better insulation can save more by reducing oil and gas
costs than it costs to insulate. To be cautious, they simply count
this savings as zero cost, then double their actual estimate for more
caution, and conclude that an aggressive policy could cost 1.4% of
world GDP.
Taking
Charge of Oil Policy
How did OPEC end up in charge again? Before the 1973 oil embargo, the
United States spent under 2 percent of its GDP on oil. Then for a few
years it spent 4 percent, and then in 1981 the cost spiked to 7.4
percent, and the world took oil prices seriously. By the end of 1985,
OPEC was crushed by world-wide conservation, and for eighteen years,
up until 2004, the United States again spent, on average, under 2
percent of GDP on oil.
During the eighteen-year grace period, and especially in the 1986,
there were two points of view. Some said to keep the price high, keep
conserving, and keep OPEC at bay. Others said they were liking the
low prices. “Liking low prices” won out.
Keeping prices low had the predicted effect; conservation wore off,
though not completely. Meanwhile, OPEC was wisely making very few new
investments in supply capacity and waiting for world oil use to grow.
It has grown, and prices are back up. The United States is now
spending 4 percent of GDP on oil up from 1.7 percent in 2001. OPEC’s
recent “energy policy” is a lot like a Kyoto policy
focused on oil, but with a startling difference.
In 1998 DOE concluded that the United States, to comply with the
Kyoto treaty, would need to push the price of gasoline up to $2.31
per gallon (2007 dollars). Similarly MIT found that a price of $70
per barrel of oil was sufficient up through 2025. In other words oil
and gas are costing more now than if we had complied with Kyoto or
something even stricter.
But that’s not the difference I’m talking about. To see
the real difference, follow the money. DOE assumed the revenues from
the tax on oil would be returned “to consumers through a
personal income tax lump sum rebate.” In other words all of the
higher gas costs of a Kyoto policy would have been returned to you
and me with an annual check from the government. (Chapter 7 will
explain why this works.) That’s the same way Alaska returns
revenues from its oil pipeline to its citizens. Needless to say, when
OPEC and Exxon raise the price of gasoline, they forget to put the
check in the mail. That’s the difference.
There is no doubt that paying OPEC is worse than paying ourselves,
but with a Kyoto-style policy, wouldn’t we have had to pay both
at once? The answer is “No” for two reasons. First,
gasoline prices only need to be just so high for conservation
purposes, say $3.00 per gallon. To the extent OPEC raises the price,
we don’t need to. Second, if we raise the price of oil first,
that curbs oil use and makes it hard for OPEC to raise the price.
A Kyoto policy initiated in 1998 would have preempted OPEC by six
years. DOE estimated that a Kyoto policy could have cut OPEC’s
prices 16 percent, but DOE’s policy was focused on coal, and
had no fuel economy measures. (DOE’s Conclusion: Kyoto
Compliance Would Reduce the Price of Oil.) With a stronger focus on
oil, OPEC’s price could have been reduced more. Also, DOE did
not anticipate such a tight oil market, and when the market is tight,
an oil conservation policy has more impact on price.
DOE is not alone in predicting that climate and independence policies
will reduce OPEC’s price. For example, MIT’s model
predicts a 47 percent reduction in the world oil price by 2050, and
others have made similar predictions. This is because the idea that
reducing demand reduces prices dates back to Adam Smith. That’s
just how markets work, even when part of the market is controlled by
a Cartel.
What
would a good oil policy look like?
As we’ll explore in greater length in chapter 7, a good oil
policy would include an “untax” on oil and a fuel-economy
incentive for car makers. An “untax” is what I will call
the DOE study’s method of refunding all revenues. It’s
not a tax because the government keeps none of the revenue. As I
mentioned, exactly how this works will be discussed in detail later.
The point to understand here is that all revenues are refunded on a
per person basis, exactly the way Alaska handles their “Permanent
Fund.”
The untax will keep encouraging us to use less oil, even if OPEC
lowers it price. Here’s an example: suppose the price of oil is
$100 per barrel when the untax is implemented. The starting untax
rate would be zero, because the oil price is already high enough. If
the price went down to $80, the untax would go up to $20 a barrel.
For consumers it would be like the price of oil stayed at $100 so
they would keep conserving and keep buying alternative fuel. But they
would still get the benefit of OPEC’s price reduction. All of
the money collected, $20 per barrel on 20 million barrels per day,
would be refunded in June by check, on an equal per-person basis.
Same as Alaska.
Keeping the domestic price of oil effectively at, say, $100 per
barrel while pocketing the difference between that and the actual
world oil price, will hold down demand, and hold down the world price
of oil. But the surprising news is that the most expensive part of a
climate policy is already in place; that is, the world oil price is
already high enough, thank you. As world oil prices come back down,
climate policy will only get cheaper.
The
Future
Since 1920, U.S. income has increased faster than energy use in every
decade. All told, and adjusting for inflation, we now have three
times as many dollars to spend per unit energy consumed. Because this
trend is expected to continue, and in spite of energy prices rising,
DOE predicts that in the future, energy will continue to cost less
rather than more as a fraction of national income. As energy has
become less important, other things, education, health, leisure, and
our natural environment, have become easier to afford and more
important.
Given the risks of climate change and energy dependence, and the low
cost of reducing these risks, inaction seems inexcusable. Paying
OPEC, Exxon and the world oil market to run our energy policy for us
seems foolish and cowardly. There is now a groundswell of public
sentiment in favor of reversing course and accepting the energy
challenge. My hope is that the following chapters will help to
improve the effectiveness of the course that will soon be chosen.
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