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May 1991 — U.N. inspectors entered postwar Iraq and began destroying chemical weapons and dismantling Iraq's nuclear-weapons program, which never built a bomb.
August 1995 — Defector Hussein Kamel, in charge of Baghdad's unconventional arms, detailed the secrets of Iraq's former biological-weapons program for U.N. interrogators. He insisted all chemical and biological arms were destroyed in 1991.
December 1998 — The U.N. inspectors withdrew from Iraq in a dispute with President Saddam Hussein's government over access to sites. Questions remained about possible hidden stockpiles of chemical arms or bioweapons.
Jan. 20, 2001 — As George W. Bush was inaugurated president, the CIA was reporting, "We do not have any direct evidence" that Baghdad was rebuilding its weapons-of-mass-destruction programs.
Jan. 30, 2001 — Bush focused his first National Security Council meeting on Iraq, ordering Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to study possible military action, according to ex-Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill.
April 10, 2001 — A classified CIA report said Iraq was shopping for thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes, said to be potential cores for centrifuges to enrich uranium to nuclear-bomb strength.
April 11, 2001 — The U.S. Energy Department's centrifuge experts disagreed, saying the tubes' dimensions weren't well-suited for centrifuges. Department analysts suggested they were meant for making conventional artillery rockets. The U.N. nuclear agency later told U.S. officials the same.
May 20, 2001 — Iraqi diplomats in Kenya informed Baghdad that a Ugandan businessman offered uranium for sale, but they turned him away, saying U.N. sanctions forbade it.
June 2001 — A shipment of Iraq's aluminum tubes was intercepted in Jordan. The news upset Baghdad's military industry chief, Abdel Tawab Huweish, who needed them to make artillery rockets. He then ordered tubes of a different metal be found, he later told U.S. arms inspectors.
June 2001 — Northern Iraq's al-Kindi factory got a government order for trailer units to make hydrogen for weather balloons. An Iraqi defector code-named "Curveball" had been telling German intelligence Iraq was building bioweapons labs atop truck trailers. But the Germans informed U.S. intelligence that Curveball was a possible alcoholic and "out of control."
Sept. 12, 2001 — The day after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, White House talk was of "getting Iraq," even though U.S. agencies found no Iraqi link to the al-Qaida terrorists, according to Richard Clarke, ex-White House anti-terrorism chief.
Oct. 7, 2001 — U.S. forces attack Afghanistan.
Feb. 6, 2002 — CIA Director George Tenet told Congress his agency believes Saddam "never abandoned his nuclear-weapons program," but he cited no evidence of an imminent threat.
Feb. 12, 2002 — In a classified report, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said a purported Niger government document told of an Iraqi deal to buy 500 tons of uranium concentrate from that central African state. A transcription of the document contained errors, suggesting forgery, that should have been easily detectable.
March 2002 — Ex-diplomat Joseph Wilson, sent to Niger by the CIA to investigate the uranium allegation, reported back that he found no basis for it. State Department intelligence said the alleged transaction was implausible.
March 2002 — U.S. analysts, apparently unaware satellite reconnaissance was doubled over suspected Iraqi chemical-weapons factories, thought they were seeing increased activity at the sites, rather than increased surveillance.
April 2002 — Workers in Iraq's western desert smelted down the last equipment from a long-defunct uranium-enrichment project.
July 23, 2002 — In London, Prime Minister Tony Blair's inner Cabinet was told by Britain's intelligence chief, fresh from high-level Washington talks, that war against Iraq had become inevitable and U.S. intelligence was being "fixed" around this policy. Blair had pledged British support for war, if the U.S. first tried to get U.N. inspectors back into Iraq.
Mid-2002 — U.S. air attacks on Iraqi defenses were sharply stepped up, under cover of patrols over Iraq's "no-fly zones."
Aug. 26, 2002 — Vice President Dick Cheney told a veterans' convention, "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction."
September 2002 — A classified DIA report said there was no reliable information on any Iraqi chemical or biological weapons.
Sept. 8, 2002 — The aluminum-tubes story was revived in a front-page New York Times article, in which unnamed U.S. officials said Iraq sought the equipment for uranium centrifuges. It said nothing about U.S. and U.N. experts who believed the tubes were meant for rocket casings.
Sept. 12, 2002 — Bush, at the United Nations, called on the world body to take action on Iraq. He, too, cited the tubes as proof of danger.
Sept. 16, 2002 — Saddam announced U.N. inspectors could return to Iraq.
Sept. 24, 2002 — Britain published an intelligence assessment saying Iraq "has made progress on WMD," but offering no conclusive evidence. Senior British government analyst Brian Jones later said leaders told the experts there was "other intelligence" they couldn't see, but none ever emerged.
Oct. 1, 2002 — U.S. agencies produced a National Intelligence Estimate that concluded, "Iraq has continued its weapons-of-mass-destruction programs," but offered no conclusive evidence.
Oct. 10-11, 2002 — Congress voted overwhelmingly to authorize Bush to use military force against Iraq.
Nov. 27, 2002 — U.N. inspectors returned to Iraq.
December 2002 — Saddam informed his senior generals in secret meetings that Iraq had no chemical or biological weapons.
January 2003 — Over two months, U.N. experts in Iraq had inspected 13 "facilities of concern" from the U.S.-British intelligence assessments and found no signs of weapons-making.
Jan. 28, 2003 — In his State of the Union address, Bush claimed Iraq sought African uranium, sought aluminum tubes for centrifuges, and built bioweapons trailers. But State Department intelligence called the "Niger uranium document" a probable hoax. State had joined Energy Department experts in viewing the tubes as likely rocket casings. And German intelligence had warned the CIA that Curveball, source of the trailers story, was an unreliable "waste of time."
Feb. 5, 2003 — Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a presentation to the U.N. Security Council, repeated many of the same questionable claims.
March 7, 2003 — The U.N. nuclear agency exposed the "Niger document" as a forgery. Its experts earlier, in a firsthand inspection, found Iraq's aluminum tubes to be poor candidates for centrifuges.
March 17, 2003 — On national television, Bush told the American people there was "no doubt" Iraq had "some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."
March 20, 2003 — U.S. armed forces bombed and invaded Iraq. Rumsfeld said of Iraqi WMD, "We know where they are." But none was found.
April 19, 2003 — An equipment-packed trailer seized in northern Iraq was said by the CIA to be one of Curveball's supposed bioweapons trailers. But tests found no trace of pathogens or toxins. It was one of the hydrogen-making trailers built under the 2001 al-Kindi contract.
Mid-2003 — The Bush administration line shifted from claiming Iraq had WMD to claiming it had WMD "programs."
May-December 2003 — David Kay's Iraq Survey Group arms hunters, poring over documents and suspect sites, interrogating scientists, found neither weapons nor programs.
December 2003 — In a Washington meeting with CIA chiefs, Kay ran into "an absolutely closed mind," he says, especially on the subjects of tubes and trailers.
Jan. 23, 2004 — Kay resigned as chief inspector, saying, "The weapons do not exist."
Feb. 12, 2004 — Tenet flew secretly to Baghdad, telling U.S. arms hunters, now under Charles Duelfer, that Iraq has WMD and they should find them, said senior inspector Rod Barton.
March 2004 — British intelligence urged Duelfer to put nine "nuggets," past unsupported allegations, into an interim report, Barton said. Duelfer rejected them as "fool's gold," Barton said.
Sept. 30, 2004 — In an election debate, Bush maintained, "Saddam Hussein had no intention of disarming."
Oct. 6, 2004 — Duelfer's final report, conveyed to the CIA on Sept. 23, is made public. It says Iraq disarmed 13 years earlier, in 1991.
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http://zfacts.com/p/150.html | 01/18/12 07:29 GMT
Modified: Fri, 14 Apr 2006 04:48:49 GMT
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