Virtually
all allowances were handed out for free under the wildly successful
sulfur dioxide trading program in the U.S.
—Nathaniel
Keohane,
Director
of Economic Policy and Analysis,
Environmental
Defense Fund, 2008
Most economists, from left to right, agree that a carbon
tax is best. But cap and trade still dominates political discussion.
The public want their emission reductions certain and their taxes
hidden, or so I’ve heard. Understand this saying, and you will
know the secret of cap and trade.
Under the sulfur dioxide trading program—the original
cap-and-trade program—the government hands out 10 million
one-ton emission permits, corresponding to about half as much sulfur
as their recipients emitted before the program. The government gives
these permits to coal-plant owners in proportion to past pollution,
and lets them know they can emit what they want, but without a
permit, they’ll be fined $2,000 a ton. No one emits without a
permit, so this rule caps emissions. The outcome is certain, and the
tax is hidden. Didn’t notice any taxes, did you?
We’ll find the hidden taxes shortly, but this chapter focuses
on how such taxes will play out politically when the little
$2-billion-per-year sulfur-cap program is scaled up to a
$345-billion-per-year carbon-cap program. The sulfur tax was easy to
hide, but a program that taxes a family of four $4,290 per year—the
price of the carbon-cap program, according to one estimate—is
likely to make headlines. This is especially likely when the tax
increases, say, 50 percent within a single year because of
speculation in the carbon-permit market.
The chief way to hide the tax revenues, thereby hiding the tax, is to
give away valuable carbon-emission permits for free. But the European
public caught on to this, and word has spread to the United States.
Thus, many current proposals call for auctioning most of the permits.
Auctions raise visible revenues, so current cap-and-trade bills all
have ways of dividing these up, as well as ways of handing out some
free permits.
But what if all the permits were auctioned and all of the revenues
were refunded to consumers? That could make the bitter pill of a
$4,290 tax sweeter. The cap would still work perfectly.
Before considering the domestic politics of caps and the possibility
of refunds, let us begin with a global perspective. After all, the
purpose of cap and trade is to solve the global warming problem.
Do
Good Caps Make Good Neighbors?
From Barack Obama to Arnold Schwarzenegger, politicians are
advocating a greenhouse gas emission cap of 80 percent below the 1990
level by 2050. I’ll call it the 80-by-2050 cap. This cap is
meant to limit the cumulative global temperature increase to about 2
degrees centigrade, or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit. The Council of the
European Union agreed with the target of 2 degrees centigrade as far
back as 1996.
Of course, to cap global temperatures, the world must cap global
emissions, not just U.S. emissions. So a policy to cap U.S. emissions
only works if the rest of the world goes along. Perhaps, if the
United States stops dragging its feet and firmly commits to achieving
this goal, others countries will follow. By implementing the
80-by-2050 cap, the United States could lead by example. To succeed,
the example must make sense to those we hope will follow.
In a purely mechanical way, having all countries target an 80 percent
reduction makes sense. But consider the 80-by-2050 cap from China’s
perspective.
In 1990, the Chinese were emitting about 2.5 tons of carbon dioxide
per person per year, so they need to cut 80 percent from that level.
In 1990, Americans were emitting about 23.4 tons per person per year.
So even after our 80 percent reduction, we still get to emit more
than China was emitting in 1990. Even as far back as 1950, the United
States was already emitting seven times as much per person as China
was in 1990.
In fact, in 1990 the United States emitted more greenhouse gas than
any other country. Starting out at the highest emission level gives
us the highest 2050 target of any country in the world.
Adopting a carbon cap for the next forty years tells the world we
think it is a fair policy. The United States is now doing its part,
so all other countries should follow us. Perhaps this is not what we
intend to say, but others might easily think so. Environmentalists
often say that any cap higher than 80-by-2050 will put us at great
risk of disastrous climate change. The unintended implication of
locking in the 80-by-2050 cap is to say to China and other countries,
“If you do not cut back to a level far below our target, the
earth is in danger, because you are not doing your part.”
This message will not make the United States a world leader, but,
once again, the world’s stumbling block. Leaders of China,
India, and Brazil have been saying this for years, and they mean it.
At Kyoto they flatly rejected cutting back to 5 percent below 1990
levels. They have been rejecting any cap at all ever since. If we
want to lead, we must first listen.
Fortunately, another approach is gaining attention. It offers real
hope for international cooperation, without which climate policy is
simply doomed. China has already surpassed the United States in
carbon emissions and is speeding ahead. The solution to this
predicament is the subject of part 4 of this book. Instead of asking
developing countries to accept the unfair caps they have already
rejected, it requires all countries to commit to an effort level
measured by the price they put on carbon.
Finding
the Taxes
We’ve been paying the sulfur-emissions “tax” for 18
years, and almost no one notices. Of course these charges are not
called taxes; that would give the game away. The government requires
expensive permits and the coal plants pass on the permit costs to
consumers. Just as with an untax, the government returns the tax
revenues—but, in this case, not to consumers. It gives them
back to the polluters in proportion to their past record of
pollution. The government returns the revenues in the form of free
carbon permits worth about $2 billion a year. Shifting revenues by
handing out free permits makes the tax almost invisible.
In the previous chapter, I showed that a cap-and-trade program and a
carbon tax are twins, but not identical. A $30 permit price reduces
emissions just as a $30 tax does, because people don’t tend to
care whether they have to pay a tax or buy permits. I didn’t
mention it at the time, but this almost proves something amazing. It
doesn’t matter who gets free permits or if they are all
auctioned, the resulting carbon emissions are the same. Permit
trading shuffles the permits around to whoever needs them most, so in
the end, the same companies get them, the permit price is the same,
and emissions are the same.
The only thing that changes if the government hands out permits
differently is who gets the permit revenues—which are just like
tax revenues. If the government gives you all the permits, you sell
them to the coal plants, and you get all the tax revenues. The coal
plants pass this cost on to consumers, who ultimately pay for the
permits you sold to the coal companies. Consumers pay the permit
tax—to you. Nice work if you can get it.
When permits are handed to the “grandfathered” polluters
for free, in effect the polluters are allowed to keep the carbon
“tax” revenues that consumers pay in the form of higher
electricity prices. This is the scheme that Keohane labels as “wildly
successful” in the chapter’s opening quote. I’m
sure the coal-plant owners quite agree.
The
Politics of Risky Business
A key factor in domestic political decisions is the impact on
business. But does requiring carbon permits harm business? If they
have to buy permits, won’t they just pass on the costs to
consumers? Yes and no. Passing costs through raises the price to
consumers, and people buy less of a company’s product. That’s
bad for business. In some cases not all of the costs can be passed
through at first. That’s also bad for business.
But businesses adjust. In the ten years between 1998 and 2008, the
price of oil went up 800 percent, and businesses did adjust, though
quite a few suffered in the process, and most are still adjusting. A
carbon cap or tax would be far milder in its effect, though it would
hurt coal mines more and the auto industry less. Even so, coal prices
will not rise by anything like 800 percent with a carbon tax or cap.
After some adjustment time, profits return to normal, which means all
the costs of the carbon permits are passed on. If permit prices take
a huge jump, the adjustment time is long, and the losses, though
temporary, greater.
A cap-and-trade program can seem to start gradually, but with permit
banking, everything changes. Permit banking allows companies to save
up permits for later use, and all currently-proposed cap-and-trade
programs allow it. A group at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) has studied an 80-by-2050 cap with permit banking
and found that even with a gradual start, permits will cost $53 per
ton at the beginning and $65 per ton five years later. This is enough
to double the price of coal. Why do permits cost so much at first
even though the cap starts gradually? It’s because of price
anticipation. If the price of carbon permits were lower—say,
$20—traders would buy them up, hold them for five years, and
sell them for $65. So banking causes carbon costs to jump from zero
before the policy is in place to $53 a ton the day it starts.
This huge initial jump hurts business for the first few years.
Unfortunately, permit banking is useful for technical reasons, which
I won’t go into, and it is here to stay. After the initial
period, volatile price fluctuations in the permit market, caused by
speculation, continue to be hard on business.
A carbon tax is not controlled by a market, nor does it involve
speculators or permit banking. So a carbon tax can start slowly and
remain stable, and it imposes a smaller cost on business. Although it
starts gradually, as I explain in the next chapter, it still has a
strong impact, because investors anticipate future high carbon-tax
rates. In this way, a carbon tax sends a strong conservation signal
for new investment while treating existing business gently.
Can
a Locked-In Cap Hit a Moving Target?
The primary argument for a cap is that it guarantees we will hit our
target. This claim carries some truth. But, for three reasons, a
target enshrined in law may well prove not to be the correct target
forty years from now.
First, governments are rarely, if ever, predictive wizards. Does
history provide any examples at all of such governmental accuracy?
Second, scientists have not reached a consensus on what the cap
should be. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) takes
no position on what emission level makes us safe and must be met. If
the IPCC ever does name a target, it will, as it always does, state a
range of uncertainty around that target. Currently, the scientific
consensus is that the uncertainty is too great to allow even an
estimate of the right target.
We know enough to be worried and to get moving. We also know we will
probably move too slowly, simply because of inertia. But the lack of
scientific consensus means that some think the problem will prove
worse than current estimates, and some think it will prove less
severe.
Caution dictates treating the problem as more serious than estimates
suggest it is until science speaks more clearly. But respect for the
diversity of legitimate opinions dictates adopting policies that
accommodate good news as well as bad news. This also broadens support
for a strong initial policy, but it means admitting that the target
will likely move.
Third, if the rest of the world does not buy into cap and trade, we
may find better ways to spend our climate dollars than on pushing our
own emissions to the lower limit. Spending our money in other parts
of the world might prove more effective at reducing emissions or
sequestering carbon.
In short, the science, economics, and politics of the world are far
too complex to warrant locking in our path forty years in advance.
Like it or not, we are shooting at a moving target. We need a policy
that recognizes this and builds in flexibility. A rigid cap is not
that policy.
Is
Safety a Bad Thing?
Almost all cap-and-trade programs come with some form of safety
valve. But one corner of the environmental camp believes the safety
valves will keep us anything but safe. The Union of Concerned
Scientists straightforwardly declares, “A cap-and-trade program
should not include a safety valve.” The Environmental Defense
Fund, on a Web page titled “Why Safety Valves Are Very
Dangerous,” calls them “failure by design.”
A safety valve limits the price of pollution permits—say, to
$100 a ton—by requiring the government to offer an unlimited
number of permits at that price. This raises the cap, as long as the
permit price stays at the safety-valve price, since more permits are
circulating. However, when permit prices are lower than the safety
price, as they have always been in the European carbon market, no one
buys extra permits, and the cap is secure.
Some say a safety valve could destroy a cap-and-trade program. But
when high permit prices turn the valve on, every emitter is still
being taxed—forced to buy permits—at this high tax rate.
That means the pressure to conserve is greatest when the safety valve
is in use. The safety valve does not reduce conservation pressure
below what it was before the valve opened; it only limits the
pressure to the maximum level deemed safe.
Setting a cap determines emissions but not cost, so the point of a
safety valve is to provide some cost certainty. Most voters reject
the view that cost is no object. Although polling data indicate a
large majority of Americans agree that something should be done about
global warming, that majority evaporates quickly when the polling
questions include costs.
John Whaley, who conducted a survey for the research and strategy
firm American Environics in 2007, describes the results as follows:
“Telling voters that global warming will lead to environmental
disaster did not lead to increased support for action on global
warming. In addition, when voters were told that specific proposals
would lead to higher energy costs, support for policies to limit
carbon dropped dramatically.” In other words, most voters place
severe limits on what they are willing to spend to meet a carbon cap.
A majority are opposed to any carbon tax at all.
Even environmentalists who consider such attitudes illegitimate must
recognize that they are real and powerful. Although a cap without a
safety valve just might become law, if voters are surprised by high
costs, they can—and may well—simply change the law.
But it is also important to realize that the idea of limiting costs
can be legitimate. It does not indicate an immoral or antisocial
attitude. Well-meaning, intelligent people can and do believe that
climate risks are uncertain and that, before we go to extremes, it
makes sense to learn more. At a minimum, it is a serious tactical
error to accuse such people of advocating “failure by design.”
Safety valves generate controversy because of a clash between a
majority of voters, who seek to limit costs, and others who believe
that cost should be no object when it comes to the 80-by-2050 cap.
These are, in part, moral judgments. My point is that both camps
should recognize the legitimacy of the other’s judgment. If
they do, I think there is room to resolve the controversy by
considering practical political consequences.
Note that the two positions lead logically to opposite views on a
safety valve. Those who believe that, because of the danger of
climate change, any cost is justified logically conclude that “no
safety valve” is the best policy—at least if it causes no
backlash. Those who place a limit on what they are willing to spend
conclude that a safety valve helps them achieve what they
want—spending what it takes to achieve the cap, but only up to
a certain cost limit.
Some in the no-limit camp seem unwilling to recognize either the
existence or the legitimacy of the pro-limit view. To assert that a
safety valve at any level is dangerous is to assert that any attempt
by me to limit my cost is dangerous. In other words, no limit that I
choose could possibly be legitimate.
The first step that the no-limit camp can take toward reconciling
these differences is to recognize that most people, like it or not,
do have serious limits on what they are willing to spend. The second
step is to realize the consequences of overrunning those limits,
which could be either a weak implementation or a backlash that later
undermines the cap’s effectiveness.
$4,290
for a Family of Four
When it comes to cost, political discussions tend to steer clear of
hard numbers. Fortunately, the MIT group evaluated the 80-by-2050
cap. They estimate that the initial cost of permits will be $345
billion per year in 2007 dollars. That comes to $4,290 for a family
of four.
Families will not purchase the permits, but the cost of the permits
will be passed through to consumers in the form of higher prices for
electricity, gasoline, home heating, and, indeed, every other
product. The revenues from these higher costs will flow to those who
receive free permits, typically coal mines and refineries, and to the
government to the extent that it sells the permits in an auction.
Revenues transferred to coal mines and refineries will typically end
up in the hands of wealthier consumers, while revenues collected by
the government will often be spent on energy-related programs.
Cap-and-trade programs, unlike carbon taxes, do not generally refund
the value of free and auctioned permits in visible ways such as by
reducing the payroll tax or sending a check in the mail. Because of
this, consumers will perceive most of the $4,290 as real net costs.
For many, the cost will be comparable in size to the income tax, with
political implications that need closer attention.
One issue, which many environmentalists have raised, is that a
cap-and-trade tax—just like a carbon tax—is regressive.
The poor pay the highest percentage rate. Although some bills include
subsidies that would help some poor with higher utility bills, this
problem has not been adequately addressed. Subsidies to energy
corporations only make the problem worse.
Moreover, the market controls permit prices, and market prices
fluctuate. In fact, studies of permit prices indicate that they
fluctuate more than stock prices and almost as much as oil prices. It
is not unheard of for permit prices to double in a year or two. This
would double the “tax” from $4,290 to $8,580 per family
of four. An event like this is likely during the first ten years of
the program, and such an event—even if people expect it to be
short-lived—would severely jeopardize the integrity of any
cap-and-trade program. From a political perspective, I think
environmentalists should be demanding safety valves to keep their
programs safe from voter backlash during such speculative
permit-price bubbles.
The problem I see with discussions of carbon-cap and carbon-tax
designs is that they do not confront the magnitude of the required
incentives. Environmentalists and politicians have ignored numbers
like $4,290 for a family of four. Without looking at dollar values,
politicians make plans to spend the carbon-permit revenues on a
myriad of pet projects and payoffs to businesses to gain their
buy-in.
This may help get legislation passed, but in the long run it will
prove catastrophic. In the long run, if cap and trade is a tax,
people will see it as a tax. Any tax of this magnitude is vulnerable,
especially when it fluctuates dramatically from year to year.
This raises the fundamental question of the carbon-pricing approach.
Does a cap-and-trade policy or a carbon tax have to be this
expensive? Shouldn’t energy policy be far cheaper?
Is
It Cheap or Expensive?
The MIT study found that an 80-by-2050 cap will cost $345 billion per
year right at the start—over 2 percent of gross domestic
product—and go up from there. But in chapter 2, I said a
startup climate program should cost much less. Only an advanced one
that cuts emissions dramatically should get into the 2 percent range.
What’s going on?
The permit cost is not the net cost to America as a whole.
Spend a dollar on a permit, and some other American gets that dollar.
Sometimes this is a net cost, and sometimes it’s just money
changing hands. Suppose the government auctions all the permits and
gives all the proceeds back to consumers. Now it doesn’t cost a
family of four $4,290; all the visible costs vanish. All that remain
are the hidden costs of reducing carbon use—which I will
discuss shortly. In spite of the 100 percent refund, the cap works
just as well, because the government still limits the number of
permits, and the rule is the same—no emissions without permits.
So a cap-and-trade system of any intensity could appear to run for
free. Moreover, running a program in this way completely solves the
problem of the tax harming the poor. As I discuss in chapter 18, it
would actually help the poor.
Environmentalists are missing this incredibly good news. They could
have a cap-and-trade program that refunds all the extra energy costs,
and it would work just as well. But there’s a little bad news
too. Saving all this carbon is still not free, even when permit
revenues are fully refunded.
But the permit costs are not the costs of saving carbon. The actual
costs are all hidden. The MIT study also estimates the actual cost
and comes up with about $10 billion, rather less than the $345
billion permit costs. That’s only at the start, but for most of
the forty years, actual costs are considerably less than the permit
costs.
However, if the government auctions the permits and uses all the
revenue to help businesses adjust, to pay for research, and to
subsidize alternative energy, then much of the $345 billion permit
cost will become actual costs for less-wealthy consumers. This comes
on top of the hidden costs, which are what actually reduce emissions.
From a political point of view, a cheap carbon cap is one that does
not transfer much wealth from consumers to special interests.
Unfortunately, cap and trade with banking of permits, as I discussed
previously, is going to hurt business at the start and continue to
hurt business as permit prices fluctuate. Consequently, business will
vigorously demand compensation—and by the looks of the bills
before Congress, they will get it. This makes cap and trade more
expensive for consumers than a carbon tax.
Should
Cap and Trade Fund Alternative Energy?
If the goal is to reduce carbon emissions, shouldn’t we spend
the $345 billion a year on stimulating new energy technology? That
would mean auctioning all the permits and devoting the proceeds to
alternative energy.
The whole point of a carbon cap or carbon tax is that a carbon
pricing policy is the cheapest policy for reducing carbon emissions.
Take a look at the initial years of a carbon cap with permit revenues
spent on government-picked energy projects.
Initial
Years under a Cap-and-Trade Program
Used to Subsidize
Energy Technology
|
Goal
|
Expenditure
|
Result
|
Correct the
underpricing of carbon
|
$10 billion
|
26% reduction
|
Subsidize energy
technology
|
$345 billion
|
Who knows?
|
Values
are from the MIT group’s analysis of a cap that declines in
a straight line until it reaches 80 percent below 1990 carbon
emissions in 2050.
|
This is no longer a cap-and-trade program; it’s a huge subsidy
program hidden under a cap-and-trade fig leaf. Though small, it’s
the fig leaf that does the work. If more emissions reductions are
needed, we should make the cap stronger rather than dumping $345
billion into subsidies.
The fundamental problem with the political discussion of
cap-and-trade programs and carbon taxes is that people mistake the
permit and tax revenues for the costs of curbing emissions and hence
see these revenues as freely available for all sorts of purposes. The
discussion needs to begin again, this time from an understanding of
the actual costs of saving carbon. These are the hidden costs of
carbon-emission abatement and, as we’ve seen, are a small
fraction of the apparent cost of cap-and-trade permits.
* * *
Carbon caps impose large and unpredictable taxes that make them
politically vulnerable. They provide less control than people claim
for them, and as I show in chapter 22, they provide an
extraordinarily poor path to international cooperation.
It is better to minimize the real costs of carbon pricing by
returning the incentive revenues to consumers. Once this is done,
real costs will be surprisingly low. In the long run, a low-cost
carbon-pricing policy will be more palatable and more secure. In the
next chapter, I explain the nature of the real, but hidden, costs of
carbon abatement.
|