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Neocon Espionage: Stephen Bryen |
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Neocon Espionage for Israel Starting in 1979
Stephen Bryen (synopsis of full story ) was seen in his Senate office with Rafiah, the Mossad (Israeli CIA) station chief in Washington, discussing classified documents spread out on a table in front of an open safe. At another time he was overheard offering these documents to Rafiah. Later, Bryen's finger prints were found on these same documents although he had stated in writing to the FBI he’d never had them in his possession.
In 1979, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert Keuch recommended a grand jury hearing to prepare for prosecution for espionage. After the Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to grant the Justice Department access to key files in the investigation, the investigation was shut down.
In April 1981, Richard Perle, just nominated as assistant secretary of defense for international security, proposed Bryen as his deputy assistant secretary. Bryen received Top Secret ("NATO/COSMIC”) clearance.
In May of 1988, Bryen attempted to approve a license for Varian Associates to export four klystrons (advanced radar technology) to Israel. A meeting was called at which all but Bryen opposed the license. Bryen suggested he ask the Israelis why they needed the klystrons. The Israeli government gave a perfunctory answer, Bryen approved the license, and the klystrons were released.
When Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage found out, he informed the State Department of DOD's “uniformly negative” reaction to the export of klystrons to Israel. The license was withdrawn, and in July, Varian Associates became the first U.S. corporation formally precluded from contracting with the Defense Department.
In April 2001, with the support of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Bryen was appointed a member of the China Commission (in part concerned with Israel's transfer of advanced technology to China) and his appointment has been extended through December of 2005.
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Israel's unauthorized arms transfers.
Foreign Policy; 6/22/1995; Clarke, Duncan
The Pentagon naturally opposes the transfer or retransfer of advanced American technology to countries that violate U.S. laws. Unlike many Pentagon units, however, DTSA has been routinely supportive of exports to "nonsuspect" companies in friendly countries. During the Reagan administration, the first head of DTSA was Stephen Bryen, who before moving to the Pentagon, was the executive director of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), an organization committed to strong security ties between the United States and Israel. Bryen's superior at Defense was Richard Perle, who now serves with Bryen on JINSA's advisory board. In the mid-1980s, Bryen allegedly called Customs Service commissioner William von Raab to complain about an investigation of alleged re-export violations by Israel. In 1988, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage admonished Bryen for trying to force through an export license for Israel over the strong objections of senior military officers. After leaving government and returning to JINSA, Bryen, who denies the von Raab incident, was a paid Pentagon consultant (with security clearance) on sensitive technology exports.
A majority (880 of 1508) of the export licenses issued by Commerce from 1988-92 for sensitive, nuclear-related, dual-use equipment were for Israel. Most licenses were to IDF end-users. Although the exports were usually conditional on Israeli pledges not to use the items for weapons purposes or to re-export them without prior U.S. government authorization, there was virtually no effort to monitor compliance. U.S. embassy officials and the GAO, therefore, questioned the value of the Israeli pledges. That the Commerce Department's review of license applications for dual-use exports is relaxed is well documented by the GAO.
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http://zfacts.com/p/764.html | 01/18/12 07:23 GMT
Modified: Fri, 21 Apr 2006 21:58:27 GMT
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Amazon
Details the preventable blunders and missed opportunities, from Bush's giving the Pentagon the lead managing postwar Iraq to our inability to work with Iraqi leaders such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Diamond expresses admiration for US Administrator L. Paul Bremer, who sincerely wanted to bring democracy to Iraq, but was wholly unprepared and unrealistic, resulting in "one of the major overseas blunders in U.S. history."
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