General (Gen.) Zinni

FOREIGN DESK

THE REACH OF WAR: DISSENT; More Calls for Rumsfeld to Leave
By MICHAEL JANOFSKY (NYT) 312 words
Published: April 3, 2006

WASHINGTON, April 2 - For the second time in two weeks, a former general has called for the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld over what both generals described as serious mistakes made in the war in Iraq.

In remarks Sunday on the NBC News program ''Meet the Press,'' Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, who once led the United States Central Command and retired from the Marines in 2000, said Mr. Rumsfeld, among others, should be held accountable for tactical mistakes in Iraq.

When asked who should resign, General Zinni said, ''Secretary of Defense, to begin with,'' adding that resignations should also come from others responsible for planning the war efforts and from military officials who sat by without pointing out potential problems.

On March 19, similar sentiments were expressed by Paul D. Eaton, a retired Army major general in charge of training the Iraqi military from 2003 to 2004. In an Op-Ed article in The New York Times, General Eaton criticized Mr. Rumsfeld's handling of the war and said that ''President Bush should accept the offer to resign that Mr. Rumsfeld says he has tendered more than once.''

Several days later, Mr. Bush dismissed calls for Mr. Rumsfeld to step down, saying he was satisfied with his job performance.

General Zinni was in charge of the Central Command from 1997 to 2000. In his television appearance, he was especially critical of what he said was the lack of ''credible planning'' for Iraq and ''not adhering to the advice that was being given to us by others.''

Referring to difficult choices made in wartime by other presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, General Zinni said: ''You have to make tough choices. Integrity and getting on with the mission and doing it right are more important than loyalty. Both are great traits, but integrity, honesty and performance and competence have to outweigh, in this business, loyalty.''

Copyright 2006 The New York Times Company

THE CASE AGAINST RUMSFELD
Posted on Sun, Apr. 23, 2006, The San Jose Mercury News
WHEN CIVILIAN PLANNERS COURT DISASTER, MILITARY LEADERS HAVE DUTY TO SPEAK UP, SAYS RETIRED GENERAL.

Gen. Anthony Zinni is one of six retired generals who have called for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to resign. From 1997 to 2000, Zinni was commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command (Centcom), which plans and conducts military activity in a region consisting of 25 countries, including those in the Persian Gulf.

The general was in the Bay Area last week to speak to the World Affairs Council of Northern California. He spoke for two nights, in Palo Alto and then San Francisco. The following are excerpts of his discussion with World Affairs Council President Jane Wales.

One of Zinni's main complaints against Rumsfeld is that he ignored planning scenarios by Centcom, among others, that suggested it might be relatively easy to depose Saddam Hussein, but it would be far more difficult to secure peace in Iraq once the dictator was gone. As a result of that earlier strategizing, Zinni thought tens of thousands more soldiers needed to be sent to Iraq early on in the war, when the Bush administration sent only about 250,000 to Iraq and the surrounding area. Wales asked Zinni how many service members he thinks should have been sent.

Zinni We estimated . . . that it would be between 380,000 and 500,000 troops necessary, at least initially to secure the borders, to maintain law and order, to protect the infrastructure and the population, to . . . ensure militias . . . would not form and present a problem for you. And so we felt that that was the range for a country that size and for, again, the kind of situation that you would find yourself in, the condition the population would be in, the mood -- the underlying ethnic and sectarian and religious animosity that existed and could be inflamed.

Wales Paul Bremer, who was head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, said that after Saddam Hussein was toppled, as the looting began, he recommended to Secretary Rumsfeld that they vastly increase the number of troops. Was that a tipping point, or was it already too late?

Zinni I believe it was too late. You know you had to go in with those numbers, again not to defeat the Republican Guard. I was concerned as I saw the march up to Baghdad, we saw the magnificent performance of our troops and the rapidity at which they were able to move on Baghdad . . . but I said at the time, they're leaving black holes behind them, because as soon as you move though an area you have removed every form of control. I mean Saddam and his authoritarian regime was a form of order and control. . . .

I don't think politically now we could . . . bring them in; it would actually be counterproductive. But we missed that opportunity and I would just say that . . . the reconstruction of a society begins when the first boot crosses what we call in the military ``the line of departure.''

In other words, when those first soldiers moved from Kuwait and kicked off the operation, that's when reconstruction starts. I never liked this idea of phasing it, of thinking there is sort of a major combat phase and then there is another phase. . . . The plan has to be seamless, and the soldiers up front, in this case taking down the regime (and) defeating the Republican Guard, have to understand what's going to come after, so they don't do things in the course of what they do that make it much more difficult for the reconstruction later on.

Wales We (in the United States) have a good deal of experience with this. We have the experience in Bosnia, experience in Kosovo. That knowledge is resident in the State Department. Why wasn't it tapped?

Zinni Well, I'm not sure. I mean I thought there was some excellent thinking on this in the State Department, even some planning that had come out. It sort of confounded me that the plan for reconstruction went to the Defense Department. . . .

In my time at Centcom, I began to become worried about not having a reconstruction plan. We had a war plan, (but) we didn't have a reconstruction plan and we were worried that the reconstruction would fall to us and the military would once again be stuck with the mission primarily.

I asked if we could convene a sort of a war game. We called it Desert Crossing; we did it in Washington, D.C. . . . We brought together members of the State Department . . . the intelligence agencies, virtually every agency in the U.S. government. And the first part of this, I asked them if we could identify the kinds of problems we might face in reconstruction, and I was overwhelmed when I saw the level of problems that were brought up.

As a matter of fact, virtually every one that occurred was brought up. . . . After we sort of digested what we might face, which again was shocking to us, I went back and asked if we could now develop an interagency plan for dealing with this. . . . At that point, the other agencies said that they would not do it -- they would not sign up to the planning; it wasn't in their charter. I went back to my headquarters at U.S. Central Command . . . and I had my staff begin planning the reconstruction, and my military staff planners were saying, ``You know we don't do political reconstruction, economic reconstruction, social reconstruction. What are we doing?'' I said, ``Nobody else is doing it. We may not know how to do it, but we now know what the problems might be.'' . . .

When I left Centcom, this Desert Crossing had become a complementary plan for reconstruction. . . . Watching the ad hoc way the (Bush administration's) reconstruction organization was put together, the lack of depth of understanding of the culture, . . . the lack of connection with the years of planning that went before that, I really became concerned that we were going to go in and our expectations were going to be overly optimistic and we were going to find ourselves mired down, which unfortunately occurred.

Wales You were, I think, the first retired general to call for the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld. Other generals, retired generals, are coming forward spontaneously and making the same call. My question is: Why now?

Zinni Well, first of all let me assure you that none of us generals have talked to each other about this. I don't even know some of these generals. It happened; it's sort of like the perfect storm, all at the same time. Many of the generals have complained about the abrasive leadership style, the lack of willingness to listen, the bullying that goes on. And I can't talk to that because I didn't serve under this secretary. I had retired before that.

My complaint is about the poor planning, the over-optimistic assumptions, the bad decision-making on the ground, the lack of understanding of the culture and a whole series of other things that had to do with the way we approached this and built what I thought was a flawed strategy in going in. . . .

But more important than that, I really believe in order to move forward, you can't have someone in charge that's constantly defending the past. . . .

You have to ask yourself the question: ``Are we able to see new, innovative approaches? Are we able to abandon old decisions and strategies and positions because we know they're not working, even though we're going to get pinned with the responsibility if you were there at the inception?''

It has been a longstanding belief and principle, and rightfully so, that while you're in uniform you only have two choices: to either accept the order and to execute it to the best of your ability; or to step aside, take off the uniform and voice your opinion from outside. During Vietnam we had books written like ``Dereliction of Duty,'' actually written by a young Army officer who is now a colonel, very successful and highly valued in the military. That was criticism of our generals, Joint Chiefs of Staff and others that remained silent, not just remained silent on active duty, which would be expected, but weren't willing to offer up their careers to do what is right. Or at least in their retirement to speak out. . . .

And what ``Dereliction of Duty'' said is: It is an obligation to speak up. You can, within the system . . . or step aside or retire and then have the obligation to give your views.

And now what I hear are voices saying you don't have that right. . . . that old generals should become eunuchs and go off somewhere and be quiet. Well, now I'm going to ask all of you, because this is a question that Americans have to decide. . . . What (should) the generals do, generals and admirals, if they feel strongly, as I do, about the mistakes that were made?

If we send our troops off with a bad weapon, a faulty rifle that malfunctioned, and no one was doing anything about it and we were losing lives; if our mission was at stake because this weapon failed and the generals knew it and they didn't say anything about it, they remained quiet either on active duty or afterwards; you would hang them from the nearest yardarm. Bad planning, bad strategy, bad decision-making can have the same effect. Yet we hear: ``You generals shouldn't talk about this. It's bad for the troops' morale.'' What? Do we think they don't notice?

Wales There is a way in which active duty military are expected to speak their minds. Throughout the National Security Council process, as you lead up to war, they are asked what resources will be needed. Their job is to say what resources are required for a given operation. Do you feel that either A, that process was bypassed? Or B, the folks in that process did not either speak their minds or get it right?

Zinni There is a process. The process, though, can be controlled by personalities. . . .

Let me tell you a short story in my experience in working for Secretary (William) Cohen, as the secretary of defense. I was asked, by the president and the secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, as the inspectors in Iraq were finding it more difficult to do their business, to prepare two options for striking Iraq. One was called a light option. One was called a heavy option. It had to do with the amount of bombing and targets we would strike. I prepared both options.

I was called by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. (Hugh) Shelton, and he said, ``You will brief the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the options.'' I came up to Washington (and) briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Immediately following this briefing there was to be a meeting of the principals. This is the secretary of state, defense, the director of Central Intelligence, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president and vice president at Camp David to make a decision on this.

In the course of my briefing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Shelton said, ``OK, you've heard both options, let's take a vote.'' The Joint Chiefs came down four to two in favor of the light option. I was then asked what option I favored. And I said the heavy option. If you're going to bomb the guy, bomb the guy. And the chairman then called down the secretary of defense and said to him, ``We have the Joint Chiefs voting one way on a split vote and the commander in chief of U.S. Central Command voting another way. How do you want to handle this?'' . . .

The secretary of defense said, ``Pack up Zinni, take him with us to Camp David.'' The secretary of defense agreed with the vote in the Joint Chiefs, for the light option. We went to Camp David, sat there in front of the president (Clinton) and the assembled principals, and the secretary of defense said, ``Mr. President, we have a split amongst your military advisers. The Joint Chiefs have voted one way, on a split vote. But your commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command feels a different way. I vote with the Joint Chiefs. But you need to hear his view. . . . I brought him here to make sure you hear his view.'' . . .

I'm just giving you (an) example of an environment where the room to talk and express different views was not only allowed, it was encouraged. And it allowed the senior decision-makers to hear everything. It allowed me to go back to my command and say, even if they didn't agree with me . . . I said my piece. And it made me feel much better about the execution of what I had to do.
GEN. ANTHONY ZINNI is the co-author of the newly published book ``The Battle for Peace: A Front-Line Vision of America's Power and Purpose.''

http://zfacts.com/p/309.html | 01/18/12 07:20 GMT
Modified: Fri, 28 Apr 2006 03:33:29 GMT

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General Zinni argues that the roots of the world's growing turmoil are not being addressed and that America's aggressive confidence is making it worse--with potentially devastating implications for the safety of Americans. (April, 2006)
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