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Liberate Iraq (excerpts from)
by Reuel Gerecht, PNAC's Director of the Middle East Initiative
Published 5/14/2001 in The Weekly Standard.
America's hayba -- its ability to inspire awe, the critical factor in the Middle East's ruthless power politics -- had vanished. And once hayba is lost, only a demonstration of indomitable force restores it.
Does anyone really believe that sanctions today, no matter how much you increase their IQ, will prevent Saddam from acting for a third time on his dreams of a new Babylonian empire?
The Clintonites tied themselves in knots trying to spin away from the undeniable facts about Saddam Hussein: that he is on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons,
But it is also possible that President Bush will make up his mind to fight. If he does, the tactical questions will become clearer. We will see first and foremost the indispensable and primary role of a U.S.-supported Iraqi opposition. We will also be thankful that Ahmad Chalabi, the chief voice of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), hasn't given up and retired to a life of ease in London.
We need to be frank, however, about one thing right from the beginning: A U.S.-armed Iraqi opposition cannot relieve the United States of the cost and responsibility once again of fielding its own troops in Iraq.
One of those costs would be the deployment of U.S. soldiers. To refuse to send large numbers of them would clearly signal that the United States still wasn't serious. For the opposition to have legitimacy and hayba in Iraqi eyes, U.S. ground forces would have to be deployed in the south
And ground troops would also be a military necessity. Combined U.S.-opposition military operations would be inevitable. American helicopter gunships -- essential for neutralizing Baghdad's armor -- don't go anywhere without mechanized foot soldiers to back them up. American foot-soldiers don't go anywhere in significant numbers without tanks in front of them. At minimum, two divisions -- roughly 50,000 troops -- would probably be needed in the beginning.
Contrary to many critics' claims, the opposition's forces would likely have significant military and intelligence value; indeed, they would probably demonstrate quite quickly that they could rout superior forces when backed up by U.S. airpower and an evident American determination to annihilate Saddam. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers would likely answer the opposition's call to change sides and fight.
Once freed of Saddam, Iraq will need an institution, untouched by the Ba'ath.
... portraying him as an ineffectual leader, devoid of the eminence necessary to draw disparate Iraqis together. Yet Chalabi may be ideal for the task, for the very reasons that often cause critics to trash him. He is rich, upper class (in the old-world sense), well educated, highly Westernized, an expatriate, and, last but not least, a Shi'ite Arab.
Anyone who has met him knows that Chalabi has presence, but the critical factor for his leadership would be America's support. Once Chalabi was chosen by us, everyone else -- the Kurds, the Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs, the Turks, Iranians, Kuwaitis, and Saudis -- would view him in an entirely new light. It is astonishing that Byman, Pollack, and Rose, and those who echo their views in the U.S. government, favor trolling for new leadership among the many factions of the Iraqi opposition -- in effect, turning the principle of divide and conquer against us. Their assertion that Chalabi has been a feckless leader of the opposition is bizarre. ... Chalabi also established his own intelligence service, which dwarfed the reach and understanding of the CIA's clandestine service. ... And Chalabi is unquestionably pro-American, in a deep, philosophical sense, which is rare among Middle Easterners. |
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http://zfacts.com/p/156.html | 01/18/12 07:20 GMT
Modified: Mon, 17 Apr 2006 17:51:20 GMT
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