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Report to the President on WMD |
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The final report on WMD requested by the President compares the Pre-War and Post-War conclusions of the CIA and Pentagon and finds the pre-war conclusions were "dead wrong." It agrees with the report of the 1400-member Iraq Survey Group report from the CIA/Pentagon, and explains the mistakes. Findings:
• Biological weapons destroyed in 1991. No bio-weapon program since.
• No nuclear weapons programs. Capability to re-start degraded since 1991.
• Undeclared chemical weapons destroyed in 1991. None manufactured later.
• No intent to use unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver WMD.
The findings prove the U.N. sanctions and inspections worked almost perfectly.
The following are quotations from the President's Report:
(March 31, 2005, www.wmd.gov/about.html)
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We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. (letter of transmittal)
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Specifically, the NIE assessed that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program and could assemble a device by the end of the decade; that Iraq had biological weapons and mobile facilities for producing biological warfare (BW) agent; that Iraq had both renewed production of chemical weapons, and probably had chemical weapons stockpiles of up to 500 metric tons; and that Iraq was developing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) probably intended to deliver BW agent.
These assessments were all wrong. (p.45)
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The Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had not tried to reconstitute a capability to produce nuclear weapons after 1991. ...it concluded that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute its program progressively decayed after 1991. (p.60)
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Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW [biological warfare] weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent shortly after the Gulf War. ... This took place in either the late spring or summer of 1991. (p. 86) |
The ISG “found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes.” (p. 87)
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The ISG concluded—contrary to the Intelligence Community’s pre-war assessments—that Iraq had actually unilaterally destroyed its undeclared CW stockpile [of chemical weapons] in 1991 and that there were no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of CW thereafter (p.119)
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The ISG found no evidence suggesting that Iraq had, at the time of the war, any intent to use UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] as BW or CW delivery systems. (p.141)
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Notes: Brackets, [ ], indicate zFacts' clarifications. Emphasis added.
NIE: the National Intelligence Estimate used by Congress to approve the war.
ISG: the "Iraq Survey Group" was a 1,400-member fact-finding mission organized by the Pentagon and CIA after the war to hunt for Saddam's suspected WMD.
Full Title:
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
Report to the President of the United States
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http://zfacts.com/p/153.html | 01/18/12 07:26 GMT
Modified: Tue, 18 Apr 2006 03:06:29 GMT
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