Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons

Dept. of Stat (1983/11/21) [Document Starts on the Next Page.]

Key Words: Iraq, Chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction

Description: Iraq used lethal chemical weapons in October 1982 and, reportedly, against Iranian forces July and August 1983 and more recently against Kurdish insurgents.


Search the Card Catalog for other titles.

Visit our Home page: 2Act.org

This document is **referred to by** the following pages: <u>War for Oil?</u>

http://zfacts.com/metaPage/lib/831121-DOS-Iraq-CW-Kurds.pdf

In Netscape, right-click links for options.



Whether to instruct USINT Baghdad to raise issue of Iragi CW use and urge cessation.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

We have recently received additional information confirming Iraqi use of chemical weapons (CW). Nevalso know that Irac has acquired a CW production capability, primarily from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary. It capits detailing U.S. CW policy and available information on Iragi use of CW is at Tab 2.) In keeping with our policy of seeking a halt to CW use wherever it occurs, we have been considering the most effective means to halt further Iraqi CW use including, as a first step, a direct approach to Iraq.

In October Iran accused Iraq of using CW and on November 8 it requested the UNSYG to investigate. Iran also stated it would soon submit a report providing information and evidence on Iraqi CW use, but has not yet done so. We do not know whether or when this issue will develop further at the UN. is, important, to make our approach to the Iraqis on this issue as early as possible, in order to deter further Iragi use of Ch. Tas well as to avoid unpleasantly surprising Iraq through public positions we may have to take on this issue

If you approve the demarche to Iraq, we will submit further recommendations for your consideration on how to handle the issue in the UN if it arises there, as well as on whether we should raise with selected European governments the fact that national firms are selling to Iraq CW production related

	DECLE OADR	
DEPARTMENT OF STATE	the first first first	MICROHLMED
PPALES REVIEW PANEL TO TT 5	20/94.	BY \$/\$-1
/ Non-responsive information	() SEALS CLASSIFICATION (a)	
DA 7	1 / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /	

DA Warnensteiner A

P910074-0238

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the instruction to USINT Baghdad at Tab 1 and the cable providing additional background on Iraqi CW use

Approve	A1/2 10/83	Disapprove	
Attachments;	(h 1/52h		

Tab 1 - Instruction cable to US Interests Section Baghdad. Tab 2 - Information cable on US CW Policy and Iraqi CW use.


Drafted: PM/TMP:JIGOnard:PMa/1 11/17/83:ph. 632-4814 tinez:NEA/ARN:FRicciardone WANG #2611P

Clearances: PM - ARaphel

. . .

PM/TMP - OGrobel 402 PM/P - Ribers PM/RSA - PTheros 442 NEA/ARN - DLMack L - MMatheson IO/UNP - CEDillery P - Akanter fr đ

ଞ NG 22 Pio :47



P910074-0240

Þ5: - 77

B1

1 160

UNSYG TO INVESTIGATE, PROVIDE BOTH AN OPENING AND THE NECESSITY TO RAISE THIS ISSUE IN BAGHDAD, AND PERHAPS LATER WITH FRIENDS WHO ARE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE IRAGI DECISION TO USE PROHIBITED CW.

4. IN KEEPING WITH THE GRAVITY OF OUR LONG-STANDING CON-CERN OVER CW PROLIFERATION AND PAST PRACTICE IN EXPRESSING THIS CONCERN, WE ARE CONSIDERING HOW TO RESPOND TO DEVELOP-MENT OF THE ISSUE IN THE UN. WE DO NOT WISH TO PLAY INTO IRAN'S HANDS BY FUELING ITS PROPAGANDA AGAINST IRAQ.

5. PLEASE PRESENT THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN APPROPRIATE MANNER TO FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ:

-- AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE USG IS VERY CONCERNED WITH THE PRESENT OVERALL SITUATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.


-- IT IS THUS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT THAT WE NOW RAISE WITH YOU AN ISSUE OF GREAT SENSITIVITY AND IMPORTANCE TO THE USG, NAMELY, PROHIBITED USE OF LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

-- WE RAISE THE ISSUE NOW NEITHER TO ENTER INTO A CONFRON-TATIONAL EXCHANGE WITH YOU, NOR TO LEND SUPPORT TO THE VIEWS OF OTHERS; BUT, RATHER, BECAUSE IT IS A LONG-STANDING POLICY OF THE U.S. TO OPPOSE USE OF LETHAL CU.

-- WE ALSO RAISE THE MATTER NOW BECAUSE WE BELIEVE CONTI-NUED IRAGI USE OF CW WILL PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO WOULD WISH TO ESCALATE TENSIONS IN THE REGION, AS WELL AS CONSTRAIN THE ABILITY OF THE USG TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN THE REGION.

-- WE NOTE THAT IRAQ LONG AGO ACCEDED TO THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL BANNING THE USE OF CW. WE BELIEVE IRAQ'S SCRUPULOUS ADHERENCE TO THAT PROTOCOL IS IMPORTANT TO AVOID DANGEROUS ESCALATION OF THE WAR- TO MAINTAIN THE HOPE OF BRINGING IRAN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND TO AVOID PROVIDING IRAN WITH A POTENT PROPAGANDA WEAPON AGAINST IRAQ.

SPIRIT IT IS INTENDED. W



OBLIGATIONS. ON NOVENBER 5. IRAN REQUESTED THE UNSYG TO INVESTIGATE. CIRAN HAD HADE SIMILAR CHARGES DURING THE 1947 UNGA- WHICH IRAG HAD DENIED-J . T

P910074-0242:

AS LONG AGO AS JULY 1988 TRACLOSED TEAM GAS AND SKIR INRITANTS AGAINST INVADING IRANIAN FORCES QUIT EFFECTIVELY IN OCTOBER 1988 UNSPECIFIED FOREIGN OFFICERS FIRED LETHAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT THE ORDERS OF SANDAM DUBING BATTLES IN THE MANDALI AREA IN JULY AND AUGUST 1983 THE IRAGIS NEFORIEDLY USED & CHEMICAL AGENT WITH LETHAL EFFECTS AGAINST AND IRANIAN FORCES INVADING IRAQ AT HAJ UMRAN

MORE RECENTLY AGAINST KURDISH INSURGENTS. · AND

IRAQI MEDIA HAVE QUOTED IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM 5. HUSSEIN AS SAYING, "THERE IS A WEAPON FOR EVERY BATTLE AND WE HAVE THE WEAPON THAT WILL CONFRONT GREAT NUMBERS." MILITARY COMMUNIQUES OVER THE PAST YEAR HAVE REFERRED TO "ALL KINDS OF WEAPONS" BEING USED TO REPLUSE THE IRANIANS. ON DECHEBER 18. 1982. IRA4 CLAINED IT WOULD RETALIATE FOR AN IRANIAN-CLAIMED TERRORIST BOMBING IN BAGHDAD "WITH NORE THAN ONE MEANS ... HE WHO FOREWARNS IS EXCUSED." A MILITARY COMMUNIQUE WARNED THE IRANIANS AGAINST VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND CHARTERS. PERHAPS TRYING TO ESTABLISH & PRETEXT FOR USING CW IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL PROTOCOLS. IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED FEBRUARY 11, 1903, IN ARABIC IN AL-HAWADITH, DEFENSE MINISTER KHAYRALLAH EVADED & QUESTION ON IRAQ'S POSSESSION OF A POISON GAS WEAPON. THE AL-HAWADITH INTERVIEW DID NOT CONFIRM IRAG'S DEVELOPMENT OF CU. BUT IT PUT THE QUESTION INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. ON APRIL 12, 1983, IRAQ AGAIN WARNED OF "NEW WEAPONS ... (TO) BE USED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN WAR ... NOT USED IN PREVIOUS ATTACKS BECAUSE OF HUMANITARIAN AND ETHICAL REASONS...THAT WILL DESTROY ANY MOVING CREATURE."

GES

31

B1

<u>P1</u>

P910074-0243

31

OVER MANY DECADES THE U.S. HAS SOUGHT TO DETER THE 8. USE OF LETHAL AND INCAPACITATING CH WHEN THEIR USE APPEARED TO LOOM AS A POSSIBILITY. IRAC'S USE OF LETHAL OR INCAPACITATING CH COULD FURTHER UNDERCUT AN IMPORTANT AGREEMENT OBSERVED BY NEARLY ALL NATIONS AGAINST CHEMICAL WARFARE. INTRODUCTION OF CW TO THE GULF WAR REPRESENTS AN ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES THAT COULD RENDER STILL HORE REMOTE THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS. FURTHERMORE, IRAQ'S USE OF CU GIVES THE IRANIANS A POWERFUL PROPAGANDA TOOL AGAINST THE IRAQI REGIME, SETTING WORLD OPINION AGAINST IRAQ AT A TIME WHEN IRAN ENJOYS LITTLE INTERNATIONAL SYMPATHY. BEYOND THE HUMANITARIAN AND SECURITY/PROLIFERATION CONCERNS, THESE FACTS SHOULD OFFSET THE ATTRACTIVENESS TO IRAQ OF USING PROHIBITED CW.

9. BOTH IRAN (IN 1929) AND IRAQ (IN 1931) HAVE RATIFIED THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925 PROHIBITING THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IRAQ ATTACHED CONDITIONS TO ITS ACCESSION, HAVING THE EFFECT OF A "NO FIRST USE" CLAUSE, BUT ITS COMMITMENT NOT TO USE UNLESS ATTACKED WITH SUCH WEAPONS IS UNEQUIVOCAL. IRAN ATTACHED NO CONDITIONS TO ITS RATIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOLS. THERE IS SOME QUESTION WHETHER IRAN MAY HAVE USED CHEMICAL AGENTS AT ONE POINT EARLY IN THE WAR.

-LO. THE EXISTING CONVENTION PROHIBITS ONLY THE USE RPT USE OF LETHAL AND INCAPACITATING CU. NO. INTERNATIONAL TREATY YET FORBIDS DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, OR DEPLOYMENT OF LETHAL AND INCAPACITATING CW. THE U.S. AND OTHERS HAVE BEEM NEGOTIATING FOR SUCH A TREATY FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. ALSO, WE DO NOT INTERPRET THE GENEVA PROTOCOL AS APPLYING TO RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AS OPPOSED TO LETHAL AND INCAPACITATING CHEMICALS. WE LIMIT THEIR USE TO DEFENSIVE MILITARY HODES TO SAVE LIVES, E.G., CONTROLLING RIOTING PLO.W.S. DISPERSING CIVILIAN "SCREENS" OF ATTACKS, RESCUE ... OPFRATIONS IN ISOLATED AREAS, AND PROTECTING CONVOYS

